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I.

INTRODUCTION

Consider the following scenario: A judge sentences a person who has
been convicted of narcotics violations by a jury of their peers. The individual is an alien living in the United States. The judge, prior to sentencing,
comments that he sentences many people who have alien status. The judge
then refuses to give the person a downward departure from the sentencing
guidelines as a result of this alien status. The judge, in explaining the reasoning for the sentence, states that the reason given for the sentence was to
punish the individual but also to generally deter others from her native
country from coming to the United States and pursuing the crimes committed by the individual. The judge then sentences the person within the fouryear sentencing range for the type of crime committed. Defense counsel
never objected at any time during sentencing and now wants to appeal,
claiming plain error. Is this plain error? Will allowing an appeal for this
type of error expand plain error too far? The court in United States v. Leung
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did not think so when it held this exact fact pattern was plain error and allowed resentencing.1
The contemporaneous objection rule has an accepted purpose of making the other party, as well as the court, aware of objections at trial, where
they can be more effectively ruled upon and judged on their merits.2 This
Comment seeks to elaborate on the true purpose of the contemporaneous
objection rule as well as the plain error rule. Further, this Comment will
address the expansion of the plain error rule beyond its intention, creating a
new “cowardly counsel” exception.3
Part II of this Comment will explain background and history of the
contemporaneous objection rule and the plain error rule. It will elaborate on
the purpose of the contemporaneous objection rule, which is to bring up
objections at trial where they can be dealt with more timely, and the purpose of the plain error rule, which is to prevent appeals on errors that could
have been addressed more effectively at the trial court level.4
Part III of this Comment will explain the issue presented by United
States v. Leung.5 The issue seeks to explore whether cases like Leung create
a new “cowardly counsel” exception to the contemporaneous objection rule
and whether expansion of the plain error rule further allows attorneys a
means of appealing without following procedures.6
Part IV will argue that (1) Leung expands the plain error rule too far,7
(2) Leung stands in contrast to the way other courts have ruled on what constitutes plain error historically,8 (3) the Leung decision should not have
been reversed because it constitutes harmless error,9 and (4) allowing exceptions like Leung will expand the plain error rule into a “cowardly counsel” exception.10
Finally, Part V of this Comment will present the conclusion that Leung
unnecessarily expands the plain error exception to the contemporaneous

1459.

1.
2.
3.
4.

United States v. Leung, 40 F.3d 577, 587 (2d Cir. 1994).
See United States v. Astling, 733 F.2d 1446, 1459 (11th Cir. 1984).
See Leung, 40 F.3d at 587.
United States v. Jacquillon, 469 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1972); Astling, 733 F.2d at

Leung, 40 F.3d at 587.
Id.; Kent Scheidegger, The Cowardly Counsel Exception, CRIME AND
CONSEQUENCES
(Dec.
23,
2010
11:17
AM),
http://www.crimeandconsequences.com/crimblog/2010/12/the-cowardly-counselexception.html.
7. Leung, 40 F.3d 577.
8. See id.; United States v. Bowles, 574 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Doe, 903 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
9. Leung, 40 F.3d 577; FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a).
10. Leung, 40 F.3d at 580; Scheidegger, supra note 6.
5.
6.
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objection rule beyond its intended purpose.11 This expansion leads to an
exception not implemented by the legislature or the Supreme Court.12 This
is an issue the Supreme Court should make a finite decision upon before the
plain error rule is expanded beyond recognition.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

THE CONTEMPORANEOUS OBJECTION RULE

“A party may preserve a claim of error by informing the court . . . of . .
. the party’s objection to the court’s action.”13 Objecting to comments is a
“condition precedent” to review these arguments on appeal.14 Counsel must
be given the opportunity to object at the trial level in order for this rule to
be effective.15 The purpose of the contemporaneous objection rule is to
have parties object during trial, a time when the judge can more adequately
rule on the issue.16 Further, this rule helps effectuate judicial efficiency by
preventing the delay of appeals when the issue could have been more effectively handled at the trial level.17
As a general rule, without a timely objection to a remark of the court at
the trial level, the issue will not be preserved for appeal.18 This is because
the purpose of the appellate courts is to review errors in law caused by determinations made by the courts at the trial level.19 However, there is an
exception to this general rule: the plain error rule.20
B.

THE PLAIN ERROR RULE

The plain error rule allows for an issue “that affects a substantial
right,” to be heard on appeal21 even if the issue was not objected to at trial.22
However, as codified, this rule merely restates common law set forth in
Wiborg v. United States, and additional clarity is needed for its scope and
11. Leung, 40 F.3d at 580.
12. See Scheidegger, supra note 6.
13. FED. R. CRIM. P. 51(b).
14. Edwards v. Patterson, 249 F. Supp. 311, 314 (D. Colo. 1965).
15. United States v. Mathis, 535 F.2d 1303, 1307 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
16. United States v. Astling, 733 F.2d 1446, 1460 (11th Cir. 1984).
17. United States v. Fix, 429 F.2d 619, 621 (9th Cir. 1970).
18. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 38 (1965).
19. Smith v. United States, 265 F.2d 14, 18 (5th Cir. 1959).
20. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b).
21. Id.
22. See Wiborg v. United States, 163 U.S. 632, 658 (1896) (elaborating on the idea
that “if a plain error was committed in a matter so absolutely vital to the defendants” the
court could review it, despite a lack of objection).
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application.23 The essential hallmark of the plain error rule’s application
came in United States v. Frady, which pointed out that this plain error rule
should be used as a means of balancing conflicting interests.24 The interests
to be balanced when considering a plain error rule exception are the interests in judicial efficiency, which ensure a fair trial “the first time around,”
and the interest in redressing obvious injustice.25 In other words, in order
for an error to be considered plain, it must “undermine the fundamental
fairness of the trial and contribute to the miscarriage of justice.”26 This
means that the appearance of justice is a factor to be considered in the context of the plain error rule, and the plain error rule is not to be applied exclusively to innocent people who have been convicted as a result of error.27
The strength and volume of evidence against the defendant is a factor the
appellate court considers when determining whether the error undermined
the fundamental fairness of the trial.28
First, the claim of plain error on appeal must be viewed in the context
of the entirety of the trial court record.29 The Court in United States v.
Young emphasized this point as essential because “each case necessarily
turns on its own facts.”30 Second, there must exist an error in order to fall
under the plain error rule.31 United States v. Olano gave the example that
someone who waives a right cannot turn around later and claim error because they knew their right and chose to waive it.32 However, if a right that
has not been waived is violated, despite a lack of assertion, that is error
according to the Supreme Court.33 Third, the said error must be plain.34 In
order to be plain, the error must be “‘clear under the current law.”35 “When
‘the explicit language of a statute or rule does not specifically resolve an
issue, there can be no plain error where there is no precedent from the Supreme Court or this Court directly resolving it.’”36
23. Id.; Jeffrey L. Lowry, Plain Error Rule—Clarifying Plain Error Analysis Under
Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1066, 1067 (1994).
24. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 164 (1982).
25. Id. at 163.
26. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 17 (1985).
27. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 3B FED. PRAC. AND PROC. CRIM. § 856 (3d ed.
2011).
28. Young, 470 U.S. at 16.
29. Id.
30. Id. (citing United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 240 (1940)).
31. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. United States v. Castro, 455 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir. 2006).
35. Id. (citing United States v. Chau, 426 F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 2005)).
36. Id. (citing Chau, 426 F.3d at 1322).
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Fourth, the error must be clear under the current legal framework at
the time of the trial.37 This sub-rule relates back to the first point that the
error must be considered in light of the full trial court record.38 Finally, the
error must affect substantial rights.39 As the Court in Young pointed out,
this usually means that the outcome would have been different had the objection been made and ruled on appropriately.40 The defendant, raising the
issue on appeal, has the burden of proving that this error was prejudicial.41
The defendant must point out specific instances of prejudice in order to
meet the burden of production that there was prejudice in fact in the judicial
proceeding.42 This is the point on which the outcome of most cases where
the defendant claims plain error turns.43
Another important facet of the plain error rule is that it is not mandatory.44 It was the intention of Congress and the practical application of the
court that the plain error rule should be used “at the sound discretion” of the
reviewing court.45 Requiring courts to apply the plain error rule would go
against the public policy in favor of ending litigation after all the issues
have been tried.46 This raises the question, when should the court exercise
its discretion and apply the plain error rule? The Court in Olano clearly
articulated that the plain error rule should be applied if the error “seriously
affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”47 This statement may seem unclear, but the court in Olano went on to
explain that this does not mean the guilt or innocence of the defendant per
se.48 The plain error rule, on the whole, is a high standard and, as a result, is
not the most desirable situation for appellate counsel to be in on review.49

37. Id. at 1253.
38. See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 17 (1985).
39. Id.; FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 735 (1993).
40. Young, 470 U.S. at 21.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 3B FED. PRAC. AND PROC. CRIM. § 856 (3rd ed.
2011).
44. Olano, 507 U.S. at 735.
45. Id. at 736.
46. United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936).
47. Olano, 507 U.S. at 735 (citing Atkinson, 297 U.S. at 160).
48. Id. at 737.
49. Benjamin K. Raybin, “Objection: Your honor Is Being Unreasonable!”—Law
and Policy Opposing the Federal Sentencing Order Objection Requirement, 63 VAND. L.
REV. 235, 244 (2010).
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THE HARMLESS ERROR RULE

A harmless error is “[a]ny error, defect, irregularity, or variance that
does not affect substantial rights.”50 The harmlessness of the error is determined on a case-by-case basis by reviewing the effect of the error made on
the verdict by the jury.51 Despite the fact that these errors are referred to as
harmless, any error at the trial level should be avoided in order to preserve
the integrity of the judicial process.52
Application of this rule is highly result-oriented, meaning the decision
as to whether it was harmless error rests on the question: Did the error affect the defendant adversely?53 The burden of proof rests on the government
to prove that the error caused no harm to the defendant.54 The “primary
question is what effect the error had, or reasonably may have had, upon the
jury’s decision.”55 The main factor is the impact of the error on the jury.56 If
the error did not influence the jury, the error should be considered harmless
by the appellate court.57 To determine the impact on the jury, the reviewing
court must consider two factors.58 First, the reviewing court should consider
what the error meant to the jury in light of the entire record of the trial.59
Second, the reviewing court must consider the jury’s reactions to this error,
not compared to the judge’s personal reaction to the error but compared to
how others may react to this error at trial.60 “The effect of an error is to be
gauged by the ‘probable impact of the (statements) on the minds of an average jury.’”61 In order to find the error harmless, the court must determine,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the alleged error had no contribution to the
determination of the defendant’s guilt.62
If the judge determines that either (1) the error had no effect on the jury’s decision or (2) the effect was only slight, then there is harmless error.63
For example, it has been held that a judge’s extraneous comments about
50. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a).
51. United States v. Ong, 541 F.2d 331, 339 (2d Cir. 1976).
52. United States v. Bosch, 505 F.2d 78, 83 (5th Cir. 1974) (citing United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157; United States v.
Vaughn, 443 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1917)).
53. United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1128-29 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
54. Cox v. Florida, 966 So. 2d 337, 350 (2007).
55. United States v. Brown, 692 F.2d 345, 350 (5th Cir. 1982).
56. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764 (1946).
57. United States v. Foster, 939 F.2d 445, 450 (7th Cir. 1991).
58. Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 764.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. United States v. Glasser, 443 F.2d 994, 1003 (2d Cir. 1971) (citing Harrington
v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1964)).
62. United States v. Bishop, 492 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir. 1974).
63. Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 765.
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America’s youth in general are harmless error and not so prejudicial as to
be a grounds for appeal.64 If this error is a departure from an accepted Constitutional norm or is specifically not allowed by Congress, the error is
more than harmless.65 Further, if the court cannot answer both of these
questions without hesitation, the error had to have affected rights substantial enough to permit reversible error.66
D.

UNITED STATES V. LEUNG

In United States v. Leung, the defendant was a Chinese alien living in
the United States.67 Leung was charged after an investigation by the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA).68 A former co-conspirator began cooperating with the DEA after being charged for narcotics violations connected to the distribution of heroin.69 Leung owned a Taoist temple in Manhattan when the DEA implemented their sting.70 After a two-week long jury
trial, Leung was convicted of the narcotics charges.71 It is from statements
made at this trial that this Comment stems.72
Leung brought five different grounds for appeal: (1) the postindictment grand jury subpoenas, (2) the in camera review of the impeachment materials related to Leung’s co-defendant, (3) the omitted portions of
the telephone transcripts in the jury room, (4) the sufficiency of the evidence, and (5) the sentencing.73 In regards to Leung’s sentencing, the defendant alleged that comments made by the judge at sentencing appeared to
mean that Leung’s ethnic origin was somehow a factor in the length of the
sentence imposed.74
At this point in Leung’s trial, the jury had already determined Leung’s
guilt, and the judge was sentencing Leung.75 The judge, addressing Leung’s
request for a downward departure from the sentencing guidelines and before actually administering a sentence, stated:

64. United States v. Perchalla, 407 F.2d 821, 822 (4th Cir. 1969).
65. Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 765 (1946) (citing Bruno v. United States 308 U.S. 287,
294 (1939)).
66. Id. at 766.
67. United States v. Leung, 40 F.3d 577, 585 (2d Cir. 1994).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See Leung, 40 F.3d at 585.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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Indeed frequently when I sentence folks who are not American citizens—she is a Canadian citizen who comes from
mainland China—frequently when I sentence nonAmerican citizens I make the observation which may to
[sic] seem cynical but it is not intended to be cynical, it is
intended to be factual: We have enough home-grown criminals in the United States without importing them. And I
don’t see this as a case if [sic] for downward departure in
any manner, shape or form. And I decline to downwardly
depart.76
After sentencing Leung, the judge explained why he chose the sentence
term he had by stating:
The purpose of my sentence here is to punish the defendant
and to generally deter others, particularly others in the Asiatic community because this case received a certain amount
of publicity in the Asiatic community, and I want the word
to go out from this courtroom that we don’t permit dealing
in heroin and it is against president [sic] law, it is against
the customs of the United States, and if people want to
come to the United States they had better abide by our
laws. That’s the reason for the sentence, punishment and
general deterrence.77
The sentence imposed by the judge was within the four-year range allowed
under the sentencing statute.78
Leung contended, on appeal, that these statements by the judge
showed evidence of an ethnic bias at sentencing and were grounds for reversible error.79 The government, in response to Leung’s appeal, argued that
Leung forfeited her right to an appeal by failing to object at the time the
comments were made at trial.80 The government also argued that the purpose of the judge, to deter people from other countries from coming to the
United States to deal in narcotics, was appropriate, and the comments were
appropriate as a result.81
The court reasoned that many times in the history of the legal system,
the court has allowed defendants to raise appeals on issues they could not
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 585.
Leung, 40 F.3d at 585.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing United States v. Malik, 680 F.2d 1162, 1166 (7th Cir. 1982)).
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have reasonably been expected to contemporaneously object to at trial.82
The court reasoned that the judge, despite harboring no bias toward Leung,
should not have mentioned ethnicity when selecting the sentence as a
means to deter others and stated that ethnicity is not a legitimate consideration.83 The court also stated that the consideration of Leung’s race could
“play no adverse role in the administration of justice.”84
The court further elaborated that even the appearance that a sentence
could have been racially motivated is ground for resentencing.85 The court
used a “reasonable observer” standard in determining whether the remarks
made by the judge could be inferred, however incorrectly, to mean that the
judge considered Leung’s race at sentencing.86 The court stated that these
comments by the judge “differ from mere passing references” to Leung’s
immigration status or nationality.87
The court in Leung at no point during the appeal doubted that the trial
judge harbored no bias toward Leung and even stated that the judge could
fairly sentence Leung on remand.88 However, the court concluded that the
“appearance of justice” would be better if Leung was resentenced by a different judge.89 Overall, the court emphasized the appearance of injustice in
the trial and deemphasized the actual justice that was handed down by the
trial judge to the convicted Leung.90
E.

UNITED STATES V. RODRIGUEZ

In United States v. Rodriguez, the defendant was a Cuban refugee living in the United States as a legal resident.91 Rodriguez and her partner developed a scheme to defraud Medicare by buying existing medical equipment companies and submitting fraudulent claims to Medicare.92 The defendant and her partner then began a phony check cashing scheme as a
means of using the money from the Medicare checks for Rodriguez’s personal use.93 As the scheme progressed, one of the stand-in owners Rodri82. Leung, 40 F.3d at 586 (citing United States v. Jacobson, 15 F.3d 19, 23 (2d Cir.
1994); United States v. Alba, 933 F.2d 1117, 1120 (2d Cir. 1991)).
83. Id. at 587.
84. Id. (citing United States v. Edwardo-Franco, 855 F.2d 1002, 1005-06 (2d Cir.
1989); United States v. Borrero-Isaza, 887 F.2d 1349, 1355-56 (9th Cir. 1989)).
85. Id.
86. Leung, 40 F.3d at 587.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See id.
91. United States v. Rodriguez, 627 F.3d 1372, 1374 (11th Cir. 2010).
92. Id. at 1375.
93. Id.
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guez used to mask her true ownership of the medical supply companies
began cooperating with the police.94 Rodriguez attempted to bribe the informant to lie to the grand jury, but the informant testified and Rodriguez
was indicted on ten counts.95
Rodriguez accepted a plea agreement, and at sentencing, the government requested a forty percent reduction in sentence in accordance with the
plea agreement.96 The government emphasized Rodriguez’s cooperation
with the government in connection with the plea but also pointed out the
severity of her crime.97 Prior to sentencing Rodriguez, the judge stated:
All right. This is really a disturbing case. She comes to this
country as a Cuban refugee seeking freedom from the
[C]ommunist rule and the first thing she does is she rips off
the Government for $19 million on a program that’s designed to help people who have physical disabilities, and to
me that’s shocking. That’s shocking.98
The judge then commented on the “generous[ness]” of the government’s
proposed sentence for Rodriguez.99 However, the judge ultimately sentenced Rodriguez to the requested amount, within the terms of the plea
agreement.100 Following the sentencing, the judge asked, “[n]ow that sentence has been imposed, does the defendant or her counsel object to the
Court’s findings of fact or the manner in which the sentence was pronounced?”101 Neither Rodriguez nor her attorney objected.102
On appeal, Rodriguez argued that, pursuant to United States v. Leung,
the court should reverse her sentence as a result of the appearance of bias in
the judge’s sentencing.103 However, the government argued that the proper
means of review was the stringent standard of the plain error rule.104
The court flatly stated that the law is well settled that if the defendant
fails to move for recusal of a judge on the grounds of bias, the appellate
court should review using the plain error standard.105 The court reasoned
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Rodriguez, 627 F.3d at 1376.
97. Id.
98. Id. (alteration in original).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Rodriguez, 627 F.3d at 1376.
102. Id.
103. Id. (citing United States v. Leung, 40 F.3d 577 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v.
Kaba, 480 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2007)).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1379 (citing United States v. Berger, 375 F.3d 1223, 1227 (11th Cir.
2004)).
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that to allow objections where there is only the appearance of bias and no
actual bias existed would be inconsistent with the existing rule of law.106
The court further explained that to allow this type of exception to the contemporaneous objection rule would go against its intention completely.107
The court emphasized the objectives of deterring “sandbagging” of issues
for the appeal, promoting the finality of criminal trials, and development of
a full and comprehensive record at trial.108
The court emphasized that allowing counsel to not object at trial and
bring the issue up for the first time on appeal allows for counsel to “keep
the issue in her pocket” with the potential for a resentence on appeal.109 The
court also pointed out that allowing counsel to forego objection does not
allow the trial judge to clear up a potential issue at the trial level, tampering
with judicial efficiency.110 Finally, the court emphasized the point that to
allow an attorney to not object at the trial level because they feel it would
harm the client is demeaning to the judge and the judge’s role in the courtroom.111 The court concluded that, since Rodriguez failed to meet the
standard of the plain error rule, there was no cause for reversal of the sentence.112
III.

THE ISSUE

There are two essential issues this Comment seeks to address. The first
is whether the holding in Leung constitutes an example of the correct application of the plain error standard of review or the harmless error standard of
review.113 Also, a result of the determination of that issue, whether the court
correctly remanded the case to the trial court level for resentencing or
whether that was unnecessary given the facts surrounding the judge’s
statements.114
As created in Leung, the second issue is whether this so-called “cowardly counsel” exception comports with the long-standing purpose and
goals of the plain error rule.115 The “cowardly counsel” exception means

106. Rodriguez, 627 F.3d at 1379.
107. Id.
108. Id. (citing United States v. Pielago, 135 F.3d 703 (11th Cir. 1998); Wainwright
v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); United States v. Sorondo, 845 F.2d 945 (11th Cir. 1988)).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Rodriguez, 627 F.3d at 1379.
112. Id.
113. United States v. Leung, 40 F.3d 577 (2d Cir. 1994).
114. Id. at 586-87.
115. See id.; Rodriguez, 627 F.3d 1372; United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 164
(1982).
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that counsel does not have to contemporaneously object at sentencing.116
This exception, if allowed, would permit counsel to not object at trial to
statements by the judge that create the appearance of a racial bias, despite
no actual bias being present.117 The question this Comment seeks to determine is whether this exception would completely undermine the established
stringency of the plain error rule.
IV.
A.

ARGUMENTS

UNNECESSARILY EXPANDS THE PLAIN ERROR RULE

The plain error standard is very high as a result of the need to preserve
the purposes of the contemporaneous objection rule.118 Courts have consistently limited their application to “exceptional situations involving serious
deficiencies which affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the
judicial proceedings.”119 The purpose for this stringent standard and limited
application is to promote judicial efficiency and prevent counsel from preserving issues for appeal that could have been easily remedied at trial. 120
The overall outcome is that a plain error standard of review is undesirable
for appeals purposes because it is such a difficult burden to overcome.121
Unlike this stringent standard, the “cowardly counsel” exception allows for counsel to fail to contemporaneously object at sentencing.122 This
exception allows counsel to appeal from a ruling that shows the appearance
of racial bias without actually establishing any injustice to the defendant
predicated on the alleged racial bias.123 This means it does not comport with
the plain error rule’s requirement of a specific showing of prejudice.124 Further, it does not require any showing of actual racial bias, only that a reasonable person hearing the statements could impute racial bias on the
court.125 Again, deviating from the specific and particular instances of prejudice the plain error rule seems to demand to be effective.126

116. Rodriguez, 627 F.3d at 1377.
117. Id.
118. Raybin, supra note 49, at 242-43.
119. United States v. Jacquillon, 469 F.2d 380, 386 (5th Cir. 1972) (citing United
States v. Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. 150 (1940)).
120. Id. (citing Bearden v. United States, 403 F.2d 782 (5th Cir. 1968); Kyle v. United States, 402 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 1968)).
121. Raybin, supra note 49, at 243.
122. See United States v. Leung, 40 F.3d 577 (2d Cir. 1994).
123. See id.; United States v. Rodriguez, 627 F.3d 1372 (11th Cir. 2010).
124. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 735 (1993).
125. See Leung, 40 F.3d at 586-87; see also Rodriguez, 627 F.3d at 1380-81.
126. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 735.
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Although not all circuits recognize a requirement to object at sentencing, failing to do so subjects the defendant to a less deferential standard of
review in order to encourage objections.127 The “cowardly counsel” exception undermines this purpose.128 The exception does not encourage objection at trial, it allows for counsel to skirt this requirement as long as the
judge makes a passing reference to the defendant’s race.129 This exception’s
purpose is to allow for the appearance of justice to be untainted.130 However, in achieving this purpose, it allows trial counsel to hide potential issues
until appeal, undermining the need for the initial trial and making the appeal the main event in the case.131
This is contrary to the predominant underlying purpose of the plain error rule, which is to promote justice through judicial efficiency.132 The
“cowardly counsel” exception would allow appeals based on the appearance of an impropriety to the defendant without the showing of specific
prejudice demanded by the plain error rule.133 This means the “cowardly
counsel” exception is not a high standard to meet, which would increase the
volume of appeals drastically.
The “cowardly counsel” exception is overly expansive in its application. While, in theory, it is preventing injustice done to criminals on the
basis of race,134 in practice, it is merely creating a judicial inefficiency. Allowing appeals without a showing of actual injustice goes against one of the
main tenets of the plain error rule and creates an expansion of it that the
courts never intended.135
It can be argued, as it was in Leung, that any mention of race should be
error plain enough to constitute a remand to the trial court for resentencing.136 However, its application is too broad. Looking to the facts of Leung,
the judge made the comment after the defendant had been sentenced and the
sentence was within the range prescribed by the Federal Sentencing Guide-

127. Raybin, supra note 49, at 243.
128. See Rodriguez, 627 F.3d at 1379.
129. See Leung, 40 F.3d 577.
130. See id. at 586-87 (“We think there is a sufficient risk that a reasonable observer,
hearing or reading the quoted remarks, might infer, however incorrectly, that Leung’s ethnicity and alien status played a role in determining her sentence.”).
131. See United States v. Astling, 733 F.2d 1446, 1460 (11th Cir. 1984).
132. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 (1982) (“[The Plain Error Rule]
was intended to afford a means for the prompt redress of miscarriages of justice.”).
133. See Leung, 40 F.3d 577; United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993).
134. See Leung, 40 F.3d at 586 (stating that “even the appearance” of racial bias will
be sufficient to warrant a resentencing).
135. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 732 (stating that the error must be “putative or real” in
order to be reviewed by the appellate court).
136. Leung, 40 F.3d at 586-87.
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lines.137 Arguably, there was no error to the defendant; the only error was to
the appearance of justice to bystanders. This is not the error the court and
the legislature intended to correct with the plain error rule.138 This is evidenced by the fact that the plain error rule requires specific instances of
prejudice to be identified and the actual substantive rights of the defendant
to be violated.139 Further, this exception does not flow from the stream of
logic the plain error rule stands for, which is to promote the purposes of the
contemporaneous objection rule by requiring an extraordinary circumstance
of injustice to have occurred.140
The plain error rule, like the contemporaneous objection rule itself,
stands for the purpose that justice must be served, but the severity and finality of the trial must be maintained.141 Whereas, the “cowardly counsel” exception arguably stands for the purpose that the appearance of justice is
what must be defended, regardless of whether or not there is any actual
harm to the defendant.142 This need for an actual harm to the defendant is
inherent in the application of the plain error rule as an exception to the contemporaneous objection rule and to remove this element is to go against the
stringency the rule was intended to have.143
B.

THE HOLDING IN LEUNG RUNS CONTRARY TO HOLDINGS IN OTHER
CIRCUITS

The holding in Leung, stating it is grounds for rehearing if the judge
mentions race absent a showing of any harm to the defendant, is unique to
that case and seems to run contrary to other circuits.144 For example, in
United States v. Doe, the prosecutor solicited testimony regarding the effect
of the Jamaican population on the drug trade.145 The prosecution further
solicited testimony from their witness that there was a general modus operandi for Jamaican drug dealers, lumping the defendant into that generalization.146 Finally, the prosecutor frequently referred to “Jamaicans” during

137. Id. at 585.
138. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 732 (stating that the error must be “putative or real” in
order to be reviewed by the appellate court).
139. Id. at 734-35.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. Leung, 40 F.3d at 586 (stating that “even the appearance” of racial bias will be
sufficient to warrant a resentencing).
143. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 732 (stating that the error must be “putative or real” in
order to be reviewed by the appellate court).
144. Leung, 40 F.3d at 586-87.
145. United States v. Doe, 903 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
146. Id.
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his references to the defendant as well as statements that the “Jamaicans
had ‘taken over’ the local drug traffic.”147
And what is happening in Washington, D.C. is that Jamaicans are coming in, they’re taking over the retail sale of
crack in Washington, D.C. It’s a lucrative trade. The money, the crack, the cocaine that is coming into the city is being taken over by people just like this—just like this.
They’re moving in on the trade. They’re going to make a
lot of money on it . . . .148
The defense never objected to these statements by the prosecutor, nor did
they object to the statements by the witness.149
Prior to its discussion of plain error, the court detailed that the mentioning of race crosses the line into error “when the argument shifts its emphasis from evidence to emotion.”150 Here, the court was referring to the
fact that the prosecutor was lumping the defendants into a category of people that had recently received negative publicity in order to influence the
jury.151 The court went on to apply the plain error rule, noting it is essential
when the jury may have given weight to these comments in their deliberations.152 The court also noted that, while there was evidence against the
defendants, it was not overwhelming, which added to the prospect that the
jury considered the prosecutor’s remarks in their deliberation process. 153
The court found that there was, in fact, an error that constituted plain error
as a result of the remarks and the lack of overwhelming evidence.154
Doe stands in stark contrast to Leung. The racial comments made in
Leung had no possible way of prejudicing the jury since the jury had finished deliberations and rendered a verdict at the time the comments were
made.155 Further, despite the fact that they were made at the time of sentencing, the court in Leung made a specific finding that, in fact, the trial
judge harbored no bias toward the defendant, and the defendant was sentenced within the prescribed statutory range.156 Therefore, the comments of
the judge could not have had any specific prejudicial effect on Leung. Fi-

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 18.
Id. at 24 (alteration in original).
Id.
Doe, 903 F.2d at 25.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 28.
Id.
Id.
United States v. Leung, 40 F.3d 577, 585 (2d Cir. 1994).
Id. at 586.
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nally, the evidence against Leung was overwhelming.157 The DEA investigation against Leung spanned the better part of four years, and the execution of the DEA’s search warrant turned up physical evidence and records
of Leung’s money laundering.158
Another example is from the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Wilson.159 In Wilson, the prosecution struck the only African American juror
from the pool of perspective jurors.160 The court then conducted a Batson
hearing in which the prosecutor articulated the legitimate reason the prospective juror was struck was that the juror had three family members that
had served prison sentences for criminal convictions.161 The defendant did
not object to the way the Batson hearing was conducted, nor did he object
to the prosecution’s articulated reason for dismissing the prospective juror.162
On appeal, the defendant claimed it was plain error for the judge not to
rule that the race-neutral reasoning proffered by the prosecution was a pretext for discrimination.163 However, in reviewing the appeal, the court rested on the fact that there was no showing of racial bias on the part of the
judge.164 Ultimately, without more of a showing of actual racial prejudice,
there was no harm that rose to the level of plain error.165
Again, this stands in contrast to the court’s reasoning in Leung. In
Leung, the court did not require any specific, objective showings of racism
against the defendant.166 In fact, the court only required that an outsider,
looking in on the court’s actions, could potentially impute a racist intent.167
Further, the court in Leung specifically found that there was no racial bias
harbored by the judge.168 In both Leung and Wilson, there was no explicit
showing of harm to the defendant, however, the outcomes are entirely the
opposite.169

157. See id. at 581.
158. Id.
159. United States v. Wilson, 11 Fed. App’x 474 (6th Cir. 2001).
160. Id. at 475.
161. Id. at 475-76.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Wilson, 11 Fed. App’x at 478 (stating that the court relied on an objective explanation for the strike and not a subjective judgment on the characteristics of the potential
juror).
165. Id.
166. United States v. Leung, 40 F.3d 577, 586 (2d Cir. 1994).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.; Wilson, 11 Fed. App’x at 478.
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Finally, the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Rodriguez addressed
this issue head on in a case with shockingly similar facts to Leung.170 The
facts of Rodriguez are laid out in Part II.E of this Comment. However, like
in Leung, the judge made a comment mentioning the defendant’s race prior
to sentencing.171 However, in Rodriguez, the court sentenced the defendant
below the range prescribed by the offense level in the sentencing guidelines
per the government’s request.172 The defense did not object to the remark
nor the sentence imposed, even after the judge explicitly asked counsel.173
The court, articulating its reasoning for denying the application of the
standard of plain error review, emphasized the fact that there was no actual
harm to the defendant because the comments were made after the jury had
determined the defendant’s guilt and the defendant was sentenced within
the allowable range.174 The court explained that the mere appearance of bias
has never been enough to satisfy the rule of law.175 The court also pointed
out what seemed to be implicit from the holdings in Doe and Wilson, that
the plain error standard is intended to be strict and to broaden it promotes
judicial inefficiency and detracts from the seriousness of the trial.176
This stark contrast in the way the court circumvented the stringency of
the plain error rule in Leung shows that the holding violates the court’s and
the legislature’s intent in creating it as an exception to the contemporaneous
objection rule.177 The fact that the court never found any actual harm to the
defendant, no potential for there to even be harm to the defendant, and, in
fact, found the opposite, goes against these circuits’ legal analyses regarding what constitutes plain error.178 The court in Leung created a new outlet
for attorneys, a means around the stringency of the plain error rule anytime
race is mentioned, even if there is no actual harm.179 This violates an essential tenant of plain error as an exception to the requirement of contemporaneous objection, as evidenced in Doe and Wilson, and is not the way the
other circuits interpret the meaning of plain error.180

170. Compare United States v. Rodriguez, 627 F.3d 1372 (11th Cir. 2010), with
Leung, 40 F.3d at 580-81.
171. Rodriguez, 627 F.3d at 1374; see Leung, 40 F.3d at 585.
172. Rodriguez, 627 F.3d at 1376.
173. Id.
174. See id.
175. Id. at 1379.
176. Id.
177. See United States v. Wilson, 11 Fed. App’x 474, 478 (6th Cir. 2001); see also
United States v. Leung, 40 F.3d 577, 586-87 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Doe, 903 F.2d
16, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
178. Leung, 40 F.3d at 586-87.
179. See id.
180. See Doe, 903 F.2d at 28; see also Wilson, 11 Fed. App’x at 478.
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It could be argued that, despite the fact that the courts have not traditionally found this to be the way to interpret the plain error rule, it is proper
to preserve the sanctity of the justice system.181 This rule may assure people
that are members of a traditionally marginalized group charged with crimes
that “they need not fear that one of their number is being treated adversely
because of his or her membership in that group . . . .”182 Arguably, this
safeguard against any appearance of racial impropriety is necessary in today’s society where racial inadequacies in the judicial system are still widely accepted as a reality.183 This method of automatically rehearing sentencing if there is any implication of racial impropriety would promote the elimination of racism in the courtroom and be a step forward for the equality of
the criminal justice system.
While this argument seems legitimate and admirable on its face, there
are some holes in its application. First, this exception applies when the issue
of race is mentioned at sentencing.184 This means it fails to eliminate the
potential for racism from the body of people actually determining the guilt
of the defendant, the jury. Also, while disparate sentences based on race are
an issue, the major focus of racism in the criminal justice system is on the
racial targeting by the police and the differences in treatment for similar
drug offenses.185 Further, the sentencing guidelines provide a range of sentences that the judge can choose from, drastically reducing the availability
for the imputation of race into a sentence.186 There is also a specific series
of affirmative steps the judge must take in order to successfully deviate
from this prescribed range, and failure to complete any of these steps satisfactorily gives a defendant an independent basis for appeal.187
Another issue with this argument’s exterior is the fact that it goes
against the intention of the plain error rule. The plain error rule is intended
to correct actual errors that are harmful to the administration of justice and
provided a tangible harm to the defendant.188 However, the court in Leung
did not require specific incidents of prejudice, rather a broad potential for
prejudice.189 Further, in order to promote judicial economy, the plain error
181. See United States v. Kaba, 480 F.3d 152, 156 (2d Cir. 2007) (stating that it was
the court’s “apparent suggestion” that the sentence was related to the defendant’s national
origin that was sufficient to impute motive by the public).
182. Id. at 159.
183. How Is the Criminal Justice System Racist?, DEFENDING JUSTICE,
http://www.defendingjustice.org/pdfs/factsheets/10-Fact%20Sheet%20%20System%20as%20Racist.pdf (last updated May 2005) [hereinafter DEFENDING JUSTICE].
184. See Leung, 40 F.3d at 586-87; see also Kaba, 480 F.3d at 156.
185. DEFENDING JUSTICE, supra note 183.
186. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.2 (2004).
187. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 491 (2000).
188. See Jeffrey L. Lowry, supra note 23, at 1067.
189. See Leung, 40 F.3d at 586.
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standard is intentionally difficult to meet.190 This is essential to preserving
the integrity of the trial process and preserving the purposes of the contemporaneous objection rule.191
This exception at sentencing would open the appeals process to anyone, despite the fact that they were sentenced fairly, as long as the judge
made an offhand comment regarding race.192 This is not what the Supreme
Court intended when they made the standard of plain error so difficult to
achieve.193 Since this invented “cowardly counsel” exception goes against
the manifest weight of case law and the intent inferred by the framers of
this standard, it cannot be said to be a natural and valuable extension of the
plain error rule.
C.

THE COURT IN LEUNG SHOULD HAVE APPLIED THE HARMLESS ERROR
STANDARD

The factual basis laid out in Leung seems to lend itself more naturally
to an analysis for harmless error than for plain error, as the court did.194 The
Supreme Court has recognized only one instance in which racial considerations cannot ever be harmless error: purely racial exclusions from a petit
jury.195 Despite that inquiry, our current standard of American jurisprudence has adopted a strong presumption in favor of harmless error and application of its analysis to findings at the trial level.196 This means that in
only a rare and exceptional few cases is anything but the harmless error
standard applied.197
One of the determinations to make when distinguishing between when
to apply the harmless error standard and when to apply the plain error
standard is whether the errors are trial errors or structural errors.198 “Structural defects are ‘defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism, which
defy analysis by ‘harmless-error’ standards.’”199 These errors remove the
fundamental fairness that a trial is intended to accord to a defendant and
eliminate the reliable finding of guilt or innocence.200
190. See id. at 586 n. 2.
191. See United States v. Astling, 733 F.2d 1446, 1460 (11th Cir. 1984).
192. See Leung, 40 F.3d at 586-87; see also United States v. Kaba, 480 F.3d 152, 156
(2d Cir. 2007).
193. See Jeffrey L. Lowry, supra note 23, at 1067.
194. See Leung, 40 F.3d at 584-85.
195. Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 587 (1986) (Burger, J., concurring).
196. Id. at 588.
197. See id.
198. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 290-91 (1991).
199. Lewis v. Pinchak, 348 F.3d 355, 357 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Fulminante, 499
U.S. at 309.).
200. Lewis, 348 F.3d at 357.
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Structural errors can be said to be found in a small class of cases, like
one in which one race is removed from the grand jury process.201 Courts
have found structural errors in cases where there is:
(1) a total deprivation of the right to counsel; (2) lack of an
impartial trial judge; (3) unlawful exclusion of grand jurors
on the basis of race; (4) denial of the right to selfrepresentation at trial; (5) denial of the right to a public trial; and (6) an erroneous reasonable doubt instruction to the
jury.202
This contrasts to trial errors. “A trial error . . . is an ‘error which occurred during the presentation of the case to the jury, and which may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in
order to determine whether its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.’”203 Essentially, it is an error the jury can weigh in light of the other
evidence presented at trial.204 The natural trial process is said to correct
these errors, rendering them predominantly harmless.205
Arguably, the facts in Leung lend themselves to neither of these determinations.206 There was no structural error because there was no factual
basis that falls into any of the six classes of cases described in Lewis.207
There was also no error that removed the fundamental fairness of the trial
because the trial was over at that point.208 Further, there was no trial error.
The alleged error occurred at sentencing, after the trial had already taken
place.209 Therefore, there was nothing for the jury to hear or weigh in comparison to the other evidence presented at the trial.210
What does this mean for the analysis of Leung? It means we need to
look at the intent of the doctrine of harmless error to find out where this
case should land. Harmless errors are traditionally those that did not
“‘ha[ve] substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the
jury’s verdict.’”211 Therefore, it can be gathered that a harmless error is an

201. Id. (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468-69 (1997)).
202. Id. (quoting Johnson, 520 U.S. at 468-69).
203. Id. (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307-08).
204. See id.
205. See id.; Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309.
206. See United States v. Leung, 40 F.3d 577 (2d Cir. 1994).
207. Lewis, 348 F.3d at 357 (quoting Johnson, 520 U.S. at 468-69).
208. Leung, 40 F.3d 577.
209. Id. at 579-80.
210. See Lewis, 348 F.3d at 357 (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991)).
211. Wilson v. Mitchell, 498 F.3d 491, 502 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 627 (1993)).
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error that causes no tangible harm to the defendant because it does not affect the verdict.212
This is the precise situation in Leung.213 There could not have been
tangible harm to Leung because the verdict had already been rendered at the
time the racial comments were made.214 Further, because the judge sentenced within the range prescribed by the guidelines, there was no tangible
harm to Leung; he received the same sentence he would have received from
a judge who chose not to make racial comments.215 Finally, on appeal, the
circuit court specifically found that the judge harbored no bias toward
Leung.216 Therefore, there could not have been a tangible harm created to
Leung by something that did not exist. Hence, the standard of harmless
error should have been applied by the appellate court on review, and the
sentencing should not have been remanded back to the trial court.
It can be argued that this is plain error because the appearance of racial
impropriety undermines the fundamental fairness of the trial, as mentioned
in Young.217 Further, racial comments like the ones made in Leung affect
the “fairness, integrity [and] public reputation of judicial proceedings.” 218
Therefore, there is strong theoretical support for the court to rule that this is
plain error in fact. This is the same argument the court in Leung made by
pointing out the reasonable person standard they used on review.219
However, this reasoning is flawed because the factual situation is
missing other essential elements that constitute plain error. Namely, the
error did not affect substantial rights.220 The comments made by the judge
did not affect Leung’s liberty interests because he was given the sentence
prescribed by the sentencing guidelines, given his crime.221 The court never
questioned the length of the sentence as interfering with Leung’s liberty
interests, and it was never an argument acknowledged in the appeal.222
It also did not affect Leung’s right to a fair trial because, at the time
the comments were made, his trial was over and the jury had already made
their determination on guilt.223 Further, there was no question of the correctness of the jury’s verdict as a result of the overwhelming evidence
212. See Wilson, 498 F.3d at 502 (citing Brecht, 507 U.S. 619).
213. See Leung, 40 F.3d 577.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 17 (1985).
218. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993) (citing United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936)).
219. Leung, 40 F.3d at 586-87.
220. Olano, 507 U.S. at 735.
221. Leung, 40 F.3d at 585-86.
222. Id.
223. Id.
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against Leung.224 These comments, while inappropriate, did not affect any
substantive right of Leung’s and did not cause him any actual harm. Therefore, these comments are harmless error and should not have been grounds
for reversal on appeal.
D.

THE HOLDING IN LEUNG CREATES A “COWARDLY COUNSEL”
EXCEPTION TO THE CONTEMPORANEOUS OBJECTION RULE

“[T]he role of an appellate judge should . . . be limited to a determination of whether the error influenced the jury, and hence contaminated the
verdict . . . .”225 The court in Leung, in explaining that the error occurred at
sentencing, circumvented this analysis.226 The comments could not have
affected the determination of the jury because the jury had already made
their determination of Leung’s guilt.227 This is not how the legislature intended the appellate courts to review for finding of plain error while maintaining the explicit purposes of the contemporaneous objection rule.228
The Supreme Court has shown, through prior holdings, that the plain
error standard of review is high and there are specific factors that must be
shown in order to warrant a finding of plain error.229 The court in Leung
only made vague references to the policy reasons for reversing the trial
court’s decisions and did not follow the structure of previous Supreme
Court decisions.230 In fact, the court never referenced either the plain error
or harmless error standards in the opinion, despite granting an exception to
the contemporaneous objection rule.231 Therefore, since the court in Leung
did not apply the standard used in plain error and did not apply the harmless
error standard, there must be another exception to the contemporaneous
objection rule the court applied. The court created the “cowardly counsel”
exception.232
Under this new “cowardly counsel” exception to the contemporaneous
objection rule, there is not obvious need for zealous representation of one’s
client.233 It allows attorneys to idly and passively ignore a judge’s com224. Id.
225. Harry T. Edwards, To Err Is Human, But Not Always Harmless: When Should
Legal Error Be Tolerated?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1167, 1171 (1995).
226. Leung, 40 F.3d 577.
227. See id.
228. Edwards, supra note 225.
229. See, e.g., United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993); United States v.
Young, 470 U.S. 1, 17 (1985); United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936).
230. Leung, 40 F.3d 577; Olano, 507 U.S. at 733; Young, 470 U.S. at 17; Atkinson,
297 U.S. at 160.
231. Leung, 40 F.3d 577.
232. United States v. Rodriguez, 627 F.3d 1372 (11th Cir. 2010); Scheidegger, supra
note 6.
233. See Rodriguez, 627 F.3d 1372.
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ments, only to later use them as the entire basis for appeal.234 It allows an
attorney to sandbag a potential issue and later reveal it, blindsiding the opposing counsel.235 Therefore, it also undermines the ability of opposing
counsel to adequately represent their client, the state.
Further, it undermines the duty of trial counsel to zealously represent
their client in order to prevent the necessity of an appeal. It does this by
essentially rewarding counsel’s fear of objection at the trial level. Allowing
counsel to ignore these issues at the trial level and reveal them later at the
appellate level gives the passive attorney a leg up on opposing counsel in
the long run.
The “cowardly counsel” exception does not allow the trial court to correct potential errors at that level and forces the appellate court to rule on an
incomplete trial record. By not allowing the trial court to correct issues and
subsequently bringing them to light on appeal, the trial record is incomplete. Therefore, the appellate court will be unable to perform their primary
function, which is to correct errors in law.236 Again, the “cowardly counsel”
exception undermines the need for a trial, making the appeal the real event
and the trial a mere formality on the road to an ultimate decision.237
The “cowardly counsel” exception also essentially destroys the need
for the contemporaneous objection rule. The purpose of the contemporaneous objection rule was to make the trial the primary place to adjudicate issues and to make all potential issues known to both parties so as to keep the
trial process transparent.238 Therefore, this “cowardly counsel” exception
crafted by the Second Circuit circumvents the need for the contemporaneous objection rule, rendering it useless. It makes the appeal the real event,
where all the issues from the trial process come into the light and are finally
ruled upon based on an incomplete trial record. It undermines not only the
trial process but the appeals process as well.
It can be argued that this is not an entirely new exception to the contemporaneous objection rule; it merely flows naturally out of the theory of
the plain error rule.239 The racial impropriety shown by the court in Leung
is sufficient to warrant a showing of plain error because it calls into question the fair administration of justice the public expects from the judicial
process.240 Further, it affected Leung’s substantive right to be free from
234. See id.
235. See id.
236. Edwards, supra note 225, at 1171.
237. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 735 (1993).
238. United States v. Astling, 733 F.2d 1446, 1460 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Fix, 429 F.2d 619, 621 (9th Cir. 1970).
239. Olano, 507 U.S. at 735 (citing United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160
(1936)); United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 17 (1985).
240. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 735 (citing Atkinson, 297 U.S. at 160).
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racial discrimination in the judicial process.241 Therefore, this is actually a
plain error analysis although it is not clearly articulated.242
However, as explained in Rodriguez, “appearance by itself is not
enough to require resentencing.”243 There needs to be actual, tangible harm
to the defendant, which was simply not present in Leung.244 Further, the
alleged plain error could not have been plain because it was based, not off
of precedent of a law or the Supreme Court, but off of the Second Circuit’s
own reasoning.245 Therefore, not only does the court not follow the highly
structured analysis most courts use when applying the plain error standard,
the case is actually void of any plain error that needs to be reviewed. Therefore, the court is creating its own, new exception: the “cowardly counsel”
exception. Thus, the Second Circuit, in creating this exception, is undermining the purpose of the contemporaneous objection rule and the necessary
stringency of the plain error standard of review on appeal.
V.

CONCLUSION

The contemporaneous objection rule has valid and necessary purposes
in the modern judicial process: judicial economy and the need for a ruling
at the time the judge is in the best position to make the determination.246
The plain error rule acts as a way of circumventing that requirement in extraordinary cases—when the trial counsel failed to object to something that
caused the defendant such great harm that the appellate court needs to circumvent that barrier.247 Although the plain error standard is high, this is
necessary to preserve the purposes of the contemporaneous objection rule
and to maintain the integrity of the judicial process.248
The plain error standard gives examples of when there is not enough
of an issue for the appellate court to circumvent the purposes of the contemporaneous objection rule and hand down a new verdict.249 Harmless
errors, while frowned upon, did not cause damage to the defendant and,
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therefore, should not be the basis for the appellate court to reverse the trial
court’s determination.250
The “cowardly counsel” exception stands in contrast to both of these
standards of review in that it does not promote the purposes of the contemporaneous objection rule. It allows the appellate court to review even the
mere appearance that an impropriety has happened, without a showing of
actual harm to the defendant.251 This compromises judicial economy by
opening the doors to appeals that would normally not have merit enough to
warrant an appellate review.252
The “cowardly counsel” exception also allows counsel to sandbag an
issue, saving it for revelation at the appellate level.253 This makes the appellate process more difficult because it makes the trial record incomplete by
not allowing the trial judge to rule on the objection.254 It also inhibits opposing counsel’s ability to advocate for their client and increases court costs
for both parties.255 Again, this undermines judicial economy. By taking the
determination away from the trial judge, it allows appeals, that may not be
necessary, to go forward as a result of counsel’s failure to timely object.
Overall, this “cowardly counsel” exception runs in contrast to both the
purposes of the contemporaneous objection rule and to the necessary stringency of the plain error standard. Therefore, this Comment suggests the
Supreme Court take action to set precedent contrary to Leung. It is necessary to prevent this exception from taking root into our current American
jurisprudence, as it will cause not only confusion for appellate courts but
may continue to flourish into a new trial strategy. Overall, the consequences
of allowing this “cowardly counsel” exception to take root outweigh any
potential benefit. The exception is not correcting any actual error or correcting any actual harm to defendants. Therefore, it is not performing a valid
function in the law and should not be allowed to continue to undermine the
valuable purposes of the contemporaneous objection rule.
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